GOVERNANCE, RISK & COMPLIANCE

From *Heat Maps to Decisions*: GRC as a Strategic Management Tool

Peter Trier Jørgensen

Security Architect · VENZO

01 Is your security posture aligned with where the organization is going?

02 Can your GRC program tell you which risks matter to your business strategy?

03 Can it give leadership the data to make informed security decisions?

It's a Tuesday afternoon in October.

QUARTERLY RISK REVIEW · OCTOBER 2025



Maria

GRC analyst

2

weeks of preparation

6

analysts consolidated across IT security, legal, operations

47

risks scored on the standard likelihood × impact matrix

1

heatmap, color-coded, ready for the executive summary



47 RISKS · 12 RED · 8 AMBER · 27 GREEN & YELLOW

“We had 11 red risks last quarter. Now 12. Are we getting worse?”

— CFO

Outcome: continue monitoring × 3 · the loudest voice's pick gets funded × 1

Why did the meeting turn out like this?

01

Compliance as the dominant lens

Optimized for evidence, not decisions.

02

Assessment without data

The infrastructure measures what the analysts guess.

03

A tool that compresses, not clarifies

5×5 grids destroy the distinctions that matter.



Looking backwards. Detached from technology. Disconnected from reality.

What if Maria could walk into that meeting with a *different kind of answer*?

Where the organization is actually exposed. How much it could cost. Which investment moves the needle most.

SECTION 2 OF 4

A different approach to GRC.

Vocabulary, model, and where the rest of this talk lives.

GRC:

the integrated capabilities that enable an organization to *achieve objectives*, *address uncertainty*, and *act with integrity*.

— OCEG

A MODEL FOR SECURITY CHOICES - THREE LAYERS · TWO LENSES

Verify

Continuous assurance

Telemetry that tells you, in real time, whether the controls you've built and invested in are still working — and surfaces drift before it becomes an incident.

- Live monitoring
- Evidence collection
- Drift & regression alerts

Invest

Where choices get made

REST OF TALK

Obligations & Compliance

Meet the controls regulators and frameworks require — proof of conformance, not a measure of safety.

- ISO 27001
- NIS2
- GDPR

Risk

Spend where it actually moves the loss curve — quantified against stated appetite.

- Threat-informed
- Scenario-based
- Quantified exposure

Build

Non-negotiable hygiene

The baseline every modern organization must have in place before risk-based investment even becomes a sensible conversation.

- MFA everywhere
- Patch cadence
- Tested backups

"A decision is only as strong as its weakest link."

CARL SPETZLER · DECISION QUALITY

DECISION QUALITY · SIX FACTORS, SIX GAPS · MARIA'S BEC RISK

A quality decision needs all six — and each one was missed for BEC.

DQ FACTOR	WHERE IT LIVES IN THE RISK PROCESS	MARIA'S BEC: WHAT WAS MISSED
01 **Frame** · *what & why*	Context establishment + scenario analysis	*"BEC" framed as generic phishing — not wire fraud against finance.*
02 **Alternatives** · *options*	Identification + treatment options	*Treatment was "continue monitoring." No options explored.*
03 **Information** · *evidence*	Analysis grounded in data	*Mailbox-compromise data existed. Phishing telemetry existed. Never used.*
04 **Tradeoffs** · *values*	Evaluation against quantified appetite	*"Amber" meant nothing in financial terms. No quantified appetite to compare to.*
05 **Reasoning** · *logic*	Structured analysis with decomposition	*Single rating. No decomposition into frequency and impact.*
06 **Commitment** · *action*	Treatment decision with owner + timeline	*"Continue monitoring" — no owner, no date, no budget.*

Six factors. Six gaps. Together they made the decision impossible.

From colored adjectives to *probable ranges of loss*

Not about precision. About clarity. Quantification expresses uncertainty without pretending to eliminate it.

THREE SOURCES · THREE QUESTIONS · STRUCTURED UPDATING

Each source answers a different question.

EXTERNAL

What happens to organizations like ours?

Industry base rates · peer experience · sector-wide incident records.

Anchor in empirical reality.

INTERNAL

What actually happens here?

Your environment · control posture · incident history · exposure surface.

Narrows external estimates toward your reality.

SME

What's likely to happen next?

Forward-looking change · planned migrations · zero-trust rollout · emerging actors.

Calibrated, structured elicitation — not "pick a number."

Inspired by “From Heatmaps to Histograms” (2026) by Tony Martin-Vegue

VERIFY LAYER · WHAT YOUR STACK ALREADY PRODUCES

The data is *already* in your environment.

Most of the internal data is being generated continuously. You don't need new data — you need to use what's there.

Likelihood	Threat intelligence · attack-surface exposure · identity posture · attack-path analysis
Impact	Data classification · asset criticality · business-process mapping — what would actually break
Control effectiveness	Posture scores · drift detection · control coverage · continuous monitoring — not just "in place," but working

Technology

Microsoft Defender · Entra · Purview · Sentinel — and equivalents in any modern stack.

LAST QUARTER · FINANCE TEAM

From *technical signal* to *risk insight*.

ENTRA ID — PHISHING-RESISTANT MFA

28	challenges issued	**23**	succeeded
5	fell back to legacy auth	**82%**	coverage

DEFENDER — PHISHING TELEMETRY

8	phishing emails reached inbox	**2**	led to credential entry
0	completed compromise	**25%**	click-through

↓ translates to ↓

Frequency of attempt

Measurable, not estimated.

Control effectiveness

Partial — legacy auth fallback is the gap.

Likelihood of materialization

Anchored in real numbers, not a 1–5 rating.

SHOWCASE · 6 SCREENSHOTS · NOT A LIVE DEMO

When the technology carries the *weight*.

A walkthrough of how the tools support each DQ factor — and what Maria's second meeting looks like.

SECTION 4 OF 4

Maria's second meeting.

Same organization. Same meeting in two weeks. A walk-through, not a demo.

STEP 00 · RISK STARTS FROM STRATEGY - PRE-DQ · STRATEGIC CONTEXT



Risk doesn't start in a register. ***It starts from what the organization is trying to achieve*** *— and what threatens that.*

STEP 01 · FRAME THE SECURITY OBJECTIVE - DQ · FRAME



*Maria isn't browsing 47 risks. **Risk starts from objectives** — and the controls that measure them.*



Scenario, not a line in a register. *Five elements you can actually reason about.*

STEP 03 · DATA-GROUNDED ANALYSIS - DQ · INFORMATION + REASONING

srp.nordvind.dk/analysis/risks?risk=R07

SECURITY RISK PLATFORM

POSTURE
- Objectives
- Controls
- Evidence

RISK
- Risk register
- Scenarios
- Analysis

TREAT
- Compare
- Decisions

Lars Henriksen
Admin · NordVind

Analysis / Risks / R07 · Wire fraud due to BEC targeted finance

ANNUAL FREQUENCY	IMPACT RANGE	EAL	VAR · 95%
0.5 / yr	1.5M – 30M DKK	3.3M DKK	~28M DKK

EXTERNAL BASE RATE

Industry benchmark

FBI IC3 2024 · energy mid-market

Annual BEC frequency, sector	0.3 – 1.0
Anchor used	0.5
Median loss, comparable orgs	4M DKK

CONFIDENCE · MEDIUM

INTERNAL POSTURE TELEMETRY — LIVE TENANT

Microsoft Graph · last 90 days

Entra ID · Microsoft Defender · finance OU

Phishing-resistant MFA · finance	43%
Legacy-auth fallback events	5 of 28
Defender phishing reaching inbox	8
Credential entry attempts	2
Completed compromise	0

CONFIDENCE · HIGH · AUDITABLE

SME FORWARD-LOOKING

Estimated by Maria Kjeldsen

CISO · NordVind · 12 Apr 2026

Impact range (P10 – P90)	1.5M – 30M DKK
Basis	IC3 median × revenue
Adjustments	+ insurance recall

CONFIDENCE · HIGH

↳ External widens · Internal narrows · SME calibrates the future. Same data already in your Azure tenant — no extra integration.

LOSS EXCEEDANCE · WIRE FRAUD DUE TO BEC TARGETED FINANCE



*Three sources, **one refined range**. The numbers underneath the risk are auditable, back to a Graph endpoint.*

STEP 03B · EVIDENCE DRILLDOWN — WHERE THE 43% COMES FROM - DQ · INFORMATION

srp.nordvind.dk/**posture/controls/IAM-MFA-003**

SECURITY RISK PLATFORM

POSTURE
- Objectives
- **Controls**
- Evidence

RISK
- Risk register
- Scenarios
- Analysis

TREAT
- Compare
- Decisions

Lars Henriksen
Admin · NordVind

Posture / Controls / **IAM-MFA-003**

Phishing-resistant MFA — finance team IAM-MFA-003

IDENTITY & ACCESS · LINKED OBJECTIVE: STRONG-AUTH · LINKED RISK: R07

43%

POSTURE · CURRENT

▲ +23 over 4 months (20→30→45→43)2

Auth method registration · finance OU · 28 users

collector: graph.microsoft.com · pulled 09:14 today · cached 4h

12 / 28

phishing-resistant

✓ live

RAW EVIDENCE · GRAPH RESPONSE

GET /REPORTS/AUTHENTICATIONMETHODS/USERREGISTRATIONDETAILS?$FILTER=DEPARTMENT EQ 'FINANCE'

```
// 28 users · finance OU · NordVind tenant
{
  "@odata.context": "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/$metadata#...",
  "@odata.count": 28,
  "summary": {
    "phishingResistantMethodRegistered": 12,
    "softwareOathRegistered": 11,
    "smsOnlyRegistered": 5,
    "noMfaRegistered": 0
  },
  "value": [
    {
      "userPrincipalName": "anna.sorensen@nordvind.dk",
      "methodsRegistered": [ "fido2", "windowsHelloForBusiness" ],
      "isPhishingResistant": true
    },
    {
      "userPrincipalName": "Maria.kjeldsen@nordvind.dk",
      "methodsRegistered": [ "microsoftAuthenticator", "sms" ],
      "isPhishingResistant": false
    },
    {
      "userPrincipalName": "jens.olsen@nordvind.dk",
      "methodsRegistered": [ "sms" ],
      "isPhishingResistant": false
    },
    // ... 25 more rows
  ]
```

*The number is **auditable** — back to its source. Same Graph endpoint your Azure admin uses. Same response.*

Loss exceedance — R07 · Wire fraud due to BEC targeted finance

10,000 SIMULATIONS · REFINED INPUTS · 90% CONFIDENCE BAND

• ABOVE TOLERANCE



EAL · BEC	VAR · 95%	P(LOSS > 25M)	ABOVE APPETITE
3.3M DKK	**28M DKK**	**~12%**	**+2pts**

NORDVIND TOLERANCE LADDER | Frequent loss 10M · 25% | **Moderate loss** **25M · 10%** | Occasional loss 50M · 5%

Exposure vs. appetite, explicit. *Twelve percent chance of losing more than 25M DKK — above stated appetite.*

← The CFO's question, answered.



Baseline · today
EAL 3.3M · P>25M 12%
✗ Above appetite by 2pts

A · Disable legacy auth ★ BEST ROI
150K · −2.6M / yr · 17× ROI
✓ P>25M 2.5% — within appetite

B · Phishing-resistant MFA
1.05M · −2.9M / yr · 2.8× ROI
✓ P>25M 1.4% — within appetite (7× cost)

C · Email gateway upgrade
350K · −0.3M / yr · 0.9× ROI
✗ P>25M 10.8% — still above appetite

Which investment moves the needle? *The trade-off is visible, not intuited.*

← The CISO's question, answered.

STEP 06 · DECISION · OWNER · COMMITMENT - DQ · COMMITMENT

ROLLS UP TO STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE

Operate securely & compliantly · Trust & license to operate

EAL **8.2M** → **5.6M**

DEC—07—A · linked to R07 · Wire fraud due to BEC targeted finance

APPROVED · 15 MAY 2026

Disable legacy authentication across finance by end of Q3.

OWNER

Anna Sørensen, IAM Lead

START · TARGET

15 May — 30 Sep 2026

BUDGET

150,000 DKK

RISK OWNER

CISO · Lars Henriksen

ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA

□ Zero successful legacy auth from finance accounts □ MFA coverage 100% across finance OU □ Phishing-resistant enrollment ≥ 95%

LINKED TREATMENT · REVIEWERS

Option A · from /scenarios/compare Reviewers · CFO · CISO · DPO Cycle · Q3 2026 governance review

MONITORING METRIC · VERIFY LAYER

Weekly Entra coverage report · finance OU

current: **43%** → target: **100%** · drift alerts on regression

SOURCE · SAME GRAPH ENDPOINT AS STEP 03

graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/ reports/authenticationMethods/ userRegistrationDetails

A decision has an owner, a date, a budget — and a way to know if it worked. *The Verify layer closes the loop.*

…and now Maria walks back in.



SAME ROOM. SAME QUESTIONS.

Different *process*.

"Are we getting worse?"	***A curve. With an appetite line.***
"Which initiative gets the budget?"	***A ranked recommendation. With reasoning.***
"What did we decide?"	***A record. With an owner. With a date.***

Same Maria. *Different process.*

WHAT YOU CAN DO MONDAY

Three shifts.

01

Start from *objectives* , not the register.

What is the organization trying to achieve, and what threatens that?

02

Make your *weakest DQ link* your roadmap.

Where is your process weakest? That's where you fix first.

03

Let the *data you already have* count the risk.

The Verify layer is already producing it. Use it.

Thank you.

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